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Abstract: Most extant work on prediction of banking crises has utilised global samples, 
which are in turn dominated by observations from middle-income countries, and rely on a 
single estimator, while a range of specifications is desirable to check robustness. However, 
economic and financial structure as well as the pattern of shocks may differ substantially 
across regions. Accordingly, in this paper we test the implicit pooling assumption in earlier 
work on Early Warning Systems using the widest range of models, by estimating logit, signal 
extraction and binary recursive tree specifications separately for crises in Asia and Latin 
America, as well as the pooled sample. Results suggest markedly different crisis determinants 
across regions, implying global samples are inappropriate. 
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Introduction 
 
The recent financial crisis has led to a renewed interest in the predictors of financial 
instability, so called early warning patterns. The literature has developed three distinctive 
approaches to development of Early Warning Systems (EWS) for banking crises, the logit 
(Demirguc Kunt and Detragiache 1998, 2005), the signal extraction approach (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 1999) and most recently the binary recursive tree (Duttagupta and Cashin 2008). 
What most existing work has in common is a focus on global panels of banking crises in order 
to derive relevant predictors. 
 
Recent work by Barrell, Davis, Liadze and Karim (2009) has shown that for the logit model at 
least, the traditional right hand side variables are not the most relevant for OECD countries 
once unadjusted bank capital adequacy, bank liquidity and house prices are added to the 
traditional variables. Earlier work by Hardy and Pararbasioglu (1998) also using logit, found 
some differences in predictors for Asia relative to the rest of a global sample, focusing on a 
unique role of foreign liabilities of banks and exchange rate depreciation. 
 
This paper seeks to investigate further the appropriateness of aggregation by assessing 
whether the crises in emerging market economies of Asia and Latin America have similar 
precursors. Furthermore unlike earlier work cited above we use the widest variety of 
methodologies. We conclude that aggregation assumptions in existing work may be 
inappropriate. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 we provide an overview of the 
literature on banking crisis prediction. In Section 2 we reassess results for logit models using 
data for Asia and Latin America separately and together. Sections 3 and 4 undertake similar 
exercises for the signal extraction and binary recursive tree approaches, and finally Section 5 
concludes. 
 
1 Literature survey 
 
Davis and Karim (2008b) provide an overview of the literature on EWS. Below we present a 
summary of the key literature and an outline of the three main methodological approaches that 
have been adopted in previous studies. These approaches have generally been applied to 
global samples of banking crises, owing in part to the relatively small number of such events. 
Such samples are in turn typically dominated by crises in middle-income countries such as 
those in Asia and Latin America. 
The first methodology is the multivariate logit model, which uses macroeconomic, 
institutional and financial variables as inputs to calculate the probability of a banking crisis as 
the output via the logistic function estimator. It is suitable for answering the question “what is 
the likelihood of a banking crisis occurring in the next t years?” Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) developed a parametric EWS for banking crises using this methodology 
using a global sample, with 31 crises. Updating their earlier work to cover 77 crises, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) found that they were correlated with macroeconomic, 
banking sector and institutional indicators. Crises occurred in periods of low GDP growth, 
high interest rates and high inflation, as well as large fiscal deficits. On the monetary side, the 
ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves and the credit to the private sector/GDP 
ratio, as well as lagged credit growth were found to be significant. Externally, there were 
often terms of trade shocks and depreciation prior to crises. Institutionally, countries with low 
GDP per capita are more prone to crises, as are those with deposit insurance. 
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Davis and Karim (2008a) used a similar approach with a global sample, but improved 
prediction by introducing more countries, crises2 and dynamics in the macro variables; over 
90% of in-sample crises were correctly identified. Barrell, Davis, Karim and Liadze (2009) 
utilised the logit approach solely for OECD countries, contrary to other papers and found a 
different set of banking crisis determinants. These are, bank liquidity, bank capital adequacy 
and lagged house price growth. Unfortunately one cannot conclude wholly different 
behaviour since these variables are generally not available for Emerging Market Economies. 
Hardy and Pararbasioglu (1998) as noted, found some differences in predictors for Asia 
relative to other regions again using logit. 
The second methodology, the non-parametric signal extraction approach of Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999), tracks individual time series prior to and during crisis episodes to answer the 
question “is there a signal of a future crisis or not?” The logic is that if an input variable’s 
aberrant behaviour can be quantitatively defined whenever that variable moves from tranquil 
to abnormal activity, a crisis is forewarned. Aberrance occurs when the variable crosses a 
threshold which the policy maker sets; the model then issues the output as a crisis signal, 
allowing preventative action to be taken. The higher the threshold, the more likely a signal is 
correct, so policy makers can manipulate thresholds depending on their degree of risk 
aversion to crisis. The Kaminsky and Reinhart study included output and stock prices as key 
indicators to signal a banking crisis. Borio and Lowe (2002) and Borio and Drehmann (2009) 
used a similar signal extraction framework, and found deviations from trend of credit growth 
and asset prices, to be useful predictors of banking crises. Davis and Karim (2008a) improve 
signal extraction for banking crisis prediction by creating composites of indicators weighted 
by their signalling quality, and found GDP growth and changes in terms of trade to be the 
most important macroeconomic indicators to monitor. 
Binary Recursive Tree (BRT) partitioning is the third methodology, and it can be used to 
answer the question “which non-linear variable interactions make an economy more 
vulnerable to crisis than others?” It can be argued that liquidity, credit and market risks are all 
potentially non-linear (e.g. once a threshold level of credit risk is surpassed, a decline in GDP 
may have a heightened impact on the probability of a crisis). The estimator identifies the 
single most important discriminator between crisis and non-crisis episodes across the entire 
sample, thereby creating two nodes. These nodes are further split into sub-nodes based on the 
behaviour of splitter variables’ non-linear interactions with previous splitter variables. This 
generates nodal crisis probabilities and the associated splitter threshold values. This is an 
innovative approach used mainly in medical research to date. The technique has been applied 
to systemic banking crises by Duttagupta and Cashin (2008) and Davis and Karim (2008b). 
The key indicators used in these studies include real interest rates, GDP growth, inflation and 
credit variables.  
The three methodological approaches each have distinct benefits and disadvantages, 
suggesting that a multi-model approach may be more appropriate than working with a single 
model. Logistic models are ideally suited to predicting a binary outcome (1 = banking crisis, 0 
= no banking crisis) using multiple explanatory variables selected on the basis of their 
theoretical or observed associations with banking crises. The logistic approach is also 
parametric, generating confidence intervals attached to coefficient values and their 
significance. On the other hand the logit coefficients are not intuitive to interpret and they do 
not reflect the threshold effects that may be simultaneously exerted by other variables.  
The advantage of the signal extraction approach is that it is non-parametric; it focuses on a 
particular variable’s association with crisis and that it can be based on high frequency data. 
But it may leave out important variable interactions that are captured by the logit. And indeed 
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 105 countries are covered by data spanning 1979-2003 which yields 72 or 102 systemic banking crises 
depending on the crisis definition used. 
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on the basis of in-sample predictive ability, the multivariate logit model outperforms the 
signal extraction approach in terms of the percentage of crises correctly predicted (Davis and 
Karim 2008a). Where a signal extraction procedure is used, optimising thresholds country by 
country improves ability to correctly predict crises. Davis and Karim (ibid) conclude that the 
logit approach is the most appropriate for use as a global EWS, while signal extraction 
methods are more appropriate for a country-specific EWS. 
The logit and BRT approaches were evaluated in predicting the subprime crisis in Davis and 
Karim (2008b). BRT is able to discover non-linear variable interactions, making it especially 
applicable to large banking crises datasets where many cross-sections are necessary to 
generate enough banking crisis observations, and numerous factors determine the occurrence 
of systemic failure. An important feature of this non-parametric technique is that no specific 
statistical distribution needs be imposed on the explanatory variables (Katz, 2006). It is also 
not necessary to assume all variables follow identical distributions or that each variable adopts 
the same distribution across cross-sections. Clearly, this is an advantage when analysing 
banking crises, since we cannot assume macro variables (such as real interest rates) and 
institutional variables (such as deposit insurance) follow identical distributions across time or 
across countries. Although logistic regression does not require variables to follow any specific 
distribution, in Davis and Karim (2008a) it was shown that standardising variables displaying 
heterogeneity across countries improved the predictive performance of logit models.  
Logistic regressions are also sensitive to outlier effects (Congdon, 2003), yet it is precisely the 
non-linear threshold effects exerted by some variables that could generate anomalous values 
in the data.  In low risk, stable regimes, variables may conform to a particular distribution 
which subsequently jumps to a regime of financial instability. Non-parametric BRTs should 
handle such data patterns better than logistic regressions. Finally, the BRT is extremely 
intuitive to interpret. The model output is represented as a tree which is successively split at 
the threshold values of variables that are deemed as important contributors to banking crises. 
 
2 Data 
 
In this paper we focus on countries in Latin America and Asia that have emerging financial 
systems and in most cases have suffered banking crises. It is hence a more homogenous 
sample than a global one including poor African countries or advanced OECD countries. The 
list of 20 countries is given below. It gives a total of 29 crises, 20 in Latin America and 9 in 
Asia, using the list given in Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), with the total length of 
periods of crisis being 72. 
 
For all three specifications we undertook estimations using all 72 crisis periods as dependent 
variables as shown in Table 1. Thus the crisis dummy takes a value of 1 for the duration of the 
crisis. This gives us early warning variables for both onset and continuance of a crisis. An 
alternative would have been to exclude post crisis observations. We note that Beck et al 
(2006) find that key results are similar across these alternatives; Barrell et al (2009) find the 
same outcome. Furthermore, as argued in Davis and Karim (2008a) the occurrence of a 
banking crisis leaves the economy vulnerable to further crises and may explain the successive 
crisis episodes observed in many economies. Omitting observations following crisis onset as 
in papers such as Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) removes this vulnerability from the 
data. 
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Table 1: Country Sample 
 
Region Country Data availability Crisis dates 
Asia 
Indonesia  1981-2007 1992-5, 1997-2002 
Korea 1987-2007 1997-2002 
Malaysia 1980-2007 1985-8, 1997-2001 
Philippines 1980-2007 1981-7, 1998-2002 
Singapore 1987-2007 no crises 
Thailand 1980-2007 1983-7, 1997-2002 
Latin 
America 
Argentina 1981-2004 1980-2, 1989-90, 1995, 2001-2 
Bolivia 1985-2006 1986-8, 1994-7, 2001-2 
Brazil 1981-2006 1990, 1994-9 
Chile 1981-2006 1981-7 
Ecuador 1981-2006 1995-2002 
El Salvador 1983-2006 1991 
Guatemala 1981-2006 no crises 
Honduras 1982-2006 no crises 
Mexico 1981-2006 1982, 1994-7 
Panama 1988-2006 1988-9 
Paraguay 1988-2006 1995-9 
Peru 1981-2006 1983-90 
Uruguay 1981-2006 1981-5, 2002 
Venezuela 1981-2006 1993-7 
 
To test for commonalities across Asia and Latin America, we employ the same set of 
independent variables as for Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) noted in Section 1 (see 
Box 1). These variables are constructed using the IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) database and World Bank Development (WDI) data. We omit deposit insurance because 
some form of it was present throughout the data period for all the countries. 
 
 
3 Logit estimation 
 
As noted in the literature survey, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) used the 
multivariate logit technique to relate the probabilities of systemic banking crises to a vector of 
Box 1: List of Variables (with variable key) 
 
Variables used in 
previous studies: 
Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2005); 
Davis and Karim 
(2008a). 
1. Real GDP Growth (%)   (YG) 
2. Real Interest Rate (%)   (RIR) 
3. Inflation (%)   (INFL) 
4. Fiscal Surplus/ GDP (%)   (BB) 
5. M2/ Foreign Exchange Reserves (%)   (M2RES) 
6. Real Domestic Credit Growth (%)   (DCG) 
7. Real GDP per capita (GCAP) 
8. Domestic credit/GDP (%) 
9. Depreciation (%)  (DEP) 
10. Change in Terms of Trade (%)  (TOT) 
 6 
explanatory variables. The banking crisis dependent variable, a binary banking crisis dummy, 
is defined in terms of observable stresses to a country’s banking system, e.g. ratio of non-
performing loans to total banking system assets exceeds 10%.3 It occurs in around 5 per cent 
of all time and country observations in that paper. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) 
updated the banking crises list to include more years, and more crises. We use the same 
dependent variable in our current work. 
 
Also following them, in this section we use the cumulative logistic distribution which relates 
the probability that the dummy for crises takes a value of one to the logit of the vector of n 
explanatory variables:  
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where Yit is the banking crisis dummy for country i at time t, β is the vector of coefficients, 
Xit is the vector of explanatory variables and F(β Xit) is the cumulative logistic distribution. 
The log likelihood function which is used to obtain actual parameter estimates is given by:  
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Although the signs on the coefficients are easily interpreted as representing an increasing or 
decreasing effect on crisis probability, the values are not as intuitive to interpret. Equation (2) 
shows the coefficients on Xit are not constant marginal effects of the variable on banking 
crisis probability since the variable’s effect is conditional on the values of all other 
explanatory variables at time t. Rather, the coefficient ßi represents the effect of Xi when all 
other variables are held at their sample mean values. Whilst this makes the detection of non-
linear variable interactions difficult, (the logit link function is linear), the logistic EWS has the 
benefit of being easily replicable by policy makers concerned with potential systemic risk in 
their countries. 
 
Unlike many extant studies which use contemporaneous independent variables, we lag all 
independent variables so as to obtain an early warning indicator of the commencement or 
continuance of a crisis. We also tested down from a general equation with all variables 
included (left hand part of table) to the simplest equation with all remaining significant 
variables (right hand side of table). 
 
Many of the variables are not significant, once we test down from the most general 
specification. For this combined Latin America and Asia sample, where there are 29 crises, 
the equation with all crisis observations includes GDP growth (crises occur in recessions), 
GDP per capita (crises are less common in richer countries) and the credit to GDP ratio (crises 
are most likely in more financially developed countries where the ratio is high). Other 
variables are insignificant.  
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 Their actual criteria are: the proportion of non-performing loans to total banking system assets exceeded 10%, 
or the public bailout cost exceeded 2% of GDP, or systemic crisis caused large scale bank nationalisation, or 
extensive bank runs were visible and if not, emergency government intervention was visible. 
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Table 2: Regressions for Latin America and Asia – all crisis periods 
 
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic Coefficient Z-statistic 
     DCRED(-1) -0.008811 -1.60491   
GDPPC(-1) -0.000286 -6.92365 -0.000310 -6.955853 
FISCY(-1) 0.030041 1.070716   
INFL(-1) -0.000282 -0.51922   
RIR(-1) 0.000148 0.808161   
DEPREC(-1) -0.000387 -1.01809   
DCREDY(-1) 0.015366 4.75962 0.008273 2.906578 
DTT(-1) 0.002579 0.5907   
DGDP(-1) -0.143596 -5.60758 -0.141868 -6.005834 
M2RES (-1) -0.000135 -1.26052   
AIC 1.0128  1.0303  
Wald statistic 
11.7783 
(0.0000)  
36.0133 
(0.0000)  
Observations 503  534  
 
There are possible structural differences between the economies of Latin America and Asia 
which could predispose them to crises in different ways. For instance the Asian crises of 1997 
were associated with private sector debt in foreign currency with stable currencies, followed 
by exchange rate depreciations and capital outflows. These were not generic features of Latin 
American crises. Pooling cross-sections would mask these differences. In order to assess 
whether Asian economies are subject to different banking crisis determinants than Latin 
American countries we multiply each explanatory variable by an Asian dummy and introduce 
it alongside the original independent counterpart.  
 
Table 3: Including leveraged coefficients for the Asian variables in the combined sample 
 
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic Coefficient z-Statistic 
     DCRED1  (-1) -0.007335 -1.29776   
δ*DCRED1  (-1) -0.026567 -1.54745 -0.036993 -2.303387 
GDPPC1  (-1) -0.000358 -5.94507 -0.000246 -7.226066 
δ*GDPPC1  (-1) 0.000112 1.195349   
FISCY1  (-1) 0.043452 1.256656   
δ*FISCY1  (-1) -0.033001 -0.43286   
INFL1  (-1) -0.000044 -0.07412   
δ*INFL1  (-1) -0.037747 -1.2113   
RIR1  (-1) 0.000164 0.725977   
δ*RIR1  (-1) 0.114665 2.524818 0.140847 4.161717 
DEPREC1  (-1) 0.000282 0.743221   
δ*DEPREC1  (-1) 0.053211 2.709868 0.045997 3.264150 
DCREDY1  (-1) 0.013992 1.170674   
δ*DCREDY1  (-1) 0.008852 0.622899   
DTT1  (-1) 0.004688 1.02259   
δ*DTT1  (-1) 0.002804 0.118322   
DGDP1  (-1) -0.116451 -3.98959 -0.149111 -6.110179 
δ*DGDP1  (-1) -0.144915 -1.96245   
M2RES1  (-1) 0.000017 0.17409   
δ*M2RES1  (-1) -0.000566 -2.14634   
AIC 0.9853  0.9921  
Wald statistic 
6.5508 
(0.000)  
23.687 
(0.0000)  
Observations 503  515  
Note: In Table 2 the coefficients and regressors can be represented as the vector βX whereas in this table the 
estimations can be expressed as βX1 + δβ*X1 where δ=0 for Latin America and δ=1 for Asia. 
 
 8 
This generates a set of “leveraged coefficients” additional to the original coefficients, where 
the former illustrate the specific crisis vulnerabilities arising from Asian economy 
characteristics and the latter show the remaining risks that are also prevalent in Latin 
American economies. Our approach therefore adds to the traditional early warning literature 
which typically utilises large pooled samples. The results for the leveraged coefficients are 
shown in Table 3. 
 
As shown in the Table, there are three variables where the leveraged coefficient is significant 
for the Asian countries, namely credit growth, real interest rates and depreciation. This 
suggests that the combined equation is not an adequate representation of the data. To show 
this further, we sought to undertake separate general-to-restricted estimates for Latin America 
and Asia. These are as shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
Table 4: Regressions for Latin America – all crisis periods 
  
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic Coefficient z-Statistic 
     DCRED(-1) -0.007335 -1.297761   
GDPPC(-1) -0.000358 -5.945074 -0.000326 -7.832812 
FISCY(-1) 0.043452 1.256656   
INFL(-1) -4.41E-05 -0.074122   
RIR(-1) 0.000164 0.725977   
DEPREC(-1) -0.000282 -0.743221   
DCREDY(-1) 0.013992 1.170674   
DTT(-1) 0.004688 1.022590   
DGDP(-1) -0.116451 -3.989594 -0.118849 -4.510090 
M2RES(-1) 1.65E-05 0.174090   
AIC 1.0235  1.0108  
Wald statistic 
9.1644 
(0.0000)  
47.4341 
(0.0000) 
 
Observations 341  376  
 
Table 5: Regressions for Asia – all crisis periods 
 
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic Coefficient z-Statistic 
     DCRED(-1) -0.033902 -2.091298 -0.032416 -2.046609 
GDPPC(-1) -0.000246 -3.451172 -0.000235 -3.535303 
FISCY(-1) 0.010451 0.153806   
INFL(-1) -0.037791 -1.212934   
RIR(-1) 0.114829 2.528462 0.113567 2.612414 
DEPREC(-1) 0.053493 2.724725 0.044323 2.712526 
DCREDY(-1) 0.022844 2.971898 0.021231 2.959820 
DTT(-1) 0.007492 0.322193   
DGDP(-1) -0.261366 -3.853235 -0.276748 -4.192324 
M2RES(-1) -0.000549 -2.232728 -0.000536 -2.190088 
AIC 0.9049  0.8722  
Wald statistic 3.9373  
5.6055 
(0.0000)  
Observations 162  162  
 
It is evident that, consistent with the leveraged estimate, the general to specific procedure 
results in quite different determinants of crises. Looking at the sample for Latin America 
alone, with 20 crises, the estimate includes only GDP per capita and GDP growth. The sample 
for Asia includes 9 crises. In this case the regression includes not only GDP per capita and 
GDP growth but also there is an effect of credit growth (crises are more likely when credit is 
already contracting), a higher real interest rate, does exchange rate depreciation, a high 
domestic credit/GDP ratio and, counter to intuition, a low M2/reserves ratio. The results for 
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real interest rates, depreciation and credit growth are consistent with the leveraged results in 
Table 3. 
 
We complement our statistical results with tests of performance. In terms of such 
performance, the standard way to assess such EWS is in terms of their ability to distinguish 
crisis and non crisis periods. As shown in Table 6, the performance of the leveraged equation 
is superior to the common coefficients, although the Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-square test of 
goodness of fit (HL) statistic remains unsatisfactory. Note that Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2005) for their most preferred equation had a type II error of 31% (i.e. 69% of 
non crises correct) and a type I error of 39% (i.e. 61% of crises correct), with an overall 
success rate of 68% at a threshold of 0.05. Hence our work overall performs well in 
comparison. 
 
Table 6: Performance of the combined Latin America and Asian equations (probability 
cut off = 0.5) 
 
Regression Latin 
America and 
Asia 
unrestricted 
(Table 2) 
Latin 
America 
and Asia 
restricted 
(Table 2) 
Latin 
America 
and Asia 
leveraged  
unrestricted 
(Table 3) 
Latin 
America 
and Asia 
leveraged 
restricted 
(Table 3) 
% crises 
correct 
27 17 35 34 
% no crises 
correct 
96 98 96 94 
% total 
correct 
81 80 82 81 
HL Stat 39.4 (0.00) 41.7(0.00) 21.9 (0.005) 30.6(0.002) 
 
Looking at the separate equations in Table 7, the overall performance of the Asian equations 
is superior to the Latin American one, with a satisfactory goodness of fit statistic and around 
2/3 of crises correctly classified even at a cut-off probability of 0.5, and satisfactory summary 
statistics as well. 
 
Table 7: Performance of the equations for separate regions (probability cut off=0.5) 
 
Regression Latin 
America 
Unrestricted 
(Table 4) 
Latin 
America 
Restricted 
(Table 4) 
Asia 
Unrestricted 
 
(Table 5) 
Asia 
Restricted 
 
(Table 5) 
% crises 
correct 
15 12 63 65 
% no crises 
correct 
99 98 90 89 
% total 
correct 
82 82 82 82 
HL Stat 21.9(0.005) 34.7(0.00) 8.8(0.36) 11.3(0.18) 
 
Table 8 constructs the results for Asia only from the Latin America and Asia combined 
results, and shows that without leverage compared to the separately estimated Asian results, 
there is a shortfall in performance in highlighting crises, which is not offset by better 
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performance in terms of non crises. On the other hand the leveraged results are almost as good 
as the separately estimated ones, as might be anticipated. 
 
Table 8: Comparing results for Asia (probability cut-off=0.5) 
 
Regression Latin 
America 
and Asia 
Unrestricted 
– Asia only 
Latin 
America 
and Asia 
Restricted 
– Asia 
only 
Latin 
America 
and Asia 
leveraged 
Unrestricted 
– Asia only 
Latin 
America 
and Asia 
leveraged 
Restricted – 
Asia only 
Asia 
estimate 
unrestricted 
Asia 
estimate 
restricted 
% crises 
correct 
42 25 63 63 63 65 
% no crises 
correct 
97 99 90 90 90 89 
% total 
correct 
81 77 82 82 82 82 
 
Overall, we conclude from the logit results that there are major differences in Asian crisis 
determinants that make a combined approach with Latin America inappropriate. This is 
shown, first, by leveraged coefficients being significant for Asia in a combined estimate 
second, in terms of the difference between individual equation results for the areas separately, 
third from the results for equation performance. In particular, the results highlight an 
importance of credit growth, real interest rates and depreciation in Asia that is not present for 
Latin America in a consistent manner. 
 
4 The signal extraction approach 
 
The signal extraction approach is a non-parametric one, which assesses the behaviour of 
single variables prior to and during crisis episodes. As noted in the literature survey, the logic 
is that if aberrant behaviour of a variable can be quantitatively defined, then whenever that 
variable moves from tranquil to abnormal activity, a crisis is forewarned. Let: 
 
i = a univariate indicator  
j = a particular country 
S= signal variable 
X = indicator 
 
An indicator variable relating to indicator i and country j is denoted by Xij and the threshold 
for this indicator is denoted as X*ij A signal variable relating to indicator i and country j is 
denoted by: S ij . This is constructed to be a binary variable where S ij = {0,1}. If the variable 
crosses the threshold, a signal is emitted and S ij = 1. This happens when 
 
  { S ij = 1 } = { │ Xij │ > │ X*ij │ }     (3) 
 
If the indicator remains within its threshold boundary, it behaves normally and does not issue 
a signal so S ij = 0,  
  { S ij = 0 } = { │ Xij │ < │ X*ij │ }    (4) 
 
Hence in a global EWS, panel data are used to derive a threshold for each variable, which 
distinguishes between normal and aberrant behaviour. Notice the directional sign may vary 
depending on whether the indicator in question has an upper or lower bound; hence the 
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variables and thresholds in equations (3) and (4) are expressed in absolute terms. Thus for a 
time series of t observations for country j and indicator i we can obtain a binary time series of 
signal or no-signal observations. This series is then checked against actual events to construct 
a measure of predictive accuracy. There are four possible scenarios as shown in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Possible outcomes with the signal extraction approach 
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If the indicator signals crisis and this correlates with an actual crisis, the outcome is denoted 
‘A’. If the signal is not matched by a crisis in reality, the outcome is denoted ‘B’. If no signal 
is emitted by the indicator but there was an actual crisis, the outcome is called ‘C’. If no 
signal is emitted and there really is no crisis, the outcome is ‘D’. 
 
Hence a perfect indicator would produce outcomes A and D only; it would correctly call all 
crises and would not issue signals unnecessarily. Outcome C represents a failure to call crisis 
(Type I error) and outcome B generates a false alarm (Type II error). Accordingly, a measure 
of signalling accuracy can be constructed for each indicator, based on the proportion of false 
alarms and missed crises; there are various criteria (e.g. minimise Type I error only) so the 
chosen measure will reflect the desires of the policy maker or private institution using the 
EWS. This is based on the inherent trade-off between Type I and Type II errors which are 
functions of the threshold; changing the threshold to allow more crises to be picked up 
necessarily raises the likelihood of false alarms. A policy maker concerned with avoiding 
crises at all costs may choose to minimise Type I errors even if this entails unnecessary 
intervention (or at least, investigation) due to more Type II errors. Likewise, in currency crisis 
models, private sector investors with positions entailing a large amount of exchange rate risk 
may prefer wider thresholds, giving them time to take alternative investment positions. On the 
other hand, policy makers with relatively stable financial systems may prefer avoiding Type II 
errors and undue intervention.  
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) choose to minimise the probability of failing to call crisis and 
the probability of false alarms simultaneously. Specifically, the Noise to Signal Ratio 
(henceforth NTSR) is given by (Type II error/ 1 – Type I error). As with normal hypothesis 
testing, changing the threshold to reduce Type I errors necessarily increases the number of 
Type II errors. The NTSR measure takes this trade-off into account; the optimal threshold will 
minimise the numerator and maximise the denominator of the NTSR. Different percentiles of 
the entire panel (i.e. cross-country) series are taken as thresholds and the corresponding NTSR 
is evaluated. The percentile that minimises the NTSR is selected and applied to each country 
to produce a country specific threshold which forms the benchmark for the EWS. The 
advantage of this non-parametric approach is that it focuses on a particular variable’s 
association with crisis and that it can be based on high frequency data. Furthermore, it may be 
more comprehensible to the non-economically trained policy maker than the logit model. 
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In the current exercise we address the signalling properties of the variables listed in Box 1. 
We employ the same sample as in the logit model outlined above: Asia, Latin America and a 
combination of both. In assessing the performance of each indicator, we make no assumption 
with regards to the policy maker’s relative aversion towards crisis episodes as opposed to 
non-crisis episodes. This means we implicitly assume the policy maker places equal weight 
on correctly calling both crisis and non-crisis states. Therefore, we assume a cut-off level of 
“noise” relative to a correct “signal” of 50% is acceptable; higher NTSRs mean the 
information carried in the signal is more likely to be incorrect than correct. Accordingly, in 
our discussion of each model below, we will focus on the top three indicators in terms of their 
NTSR performance, since the remaining indicators generate NTSRs above 50%. 
 
Figure 2 shows the signalling properties of each variable in the Asian country model. The best 
indicator is GDP growth since it is associated with the lowest NTSR for any given threshold. 
This result accords with the logit results above as well as Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998, 2005) and Davis and Karim (2008) who found GDP growth to be an important leading 
indicator of banking crises across a heterogeneous range of countries. The procyclicality of 
financial instability implies GDP growth should capture boom and bust cycles and since 
credit risk increases during financial downturns (due to decreases in collateral values, 
especially property prices), recessions are associated with higher levels of non-performing 
loans than periods of high economic growth.  
 
 
Figure 2: NTSR vs Threshold, Asia 
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The second best predictor of the banking crises in Asia is the fiscal surplus to GDP ratio. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) highlight the detrimental impact of banking crises on government 
finances so that fiscal surpluses can rapidly convert to deficits in the wake of banking crises. 
If countries have fiscal deficits alongside banking system vulnerability, their ability to bail out 
their banking systems is restricted so that systemic crises become more likely.  
 
The third best predictor of the Asian banking crises is the percentage deprecation experienced 
by their currencies, which exacerbated the burden of private sector debt in foreign currency. 
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As we discuss below, depreciation is not one of the best performing leading crisis indicator in 
the Latin American countries.  
 
Note that GDP growth, fiscal surplus/ GDP and depreciation appear to have identical optimal 
thresholds. Although the NTSR remains constant between the range T = 0.5 to 3.5, the 
optimal threshold would be 3.5 since this allows GDP growth and fiscal surpluses to 
deteriorate over this range before a signal is considered by the policy maker. Similarly, 
depreciation can worsen over the threshold range before the policy maker must accept a crisis 
is imminent. Since all the remaining variables generate much higher NTSRs than the three 
indicators discussed above, we will not rely on them as leading indicators. We next discuss 
the variable performances in the Latin American country model which are shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: NTSR vs Threshold, Latin America 
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When considering the prediction of banking crises that occurred in Latin American countries 
over the years 1980 – 2007, GDP growth appears again to be important. This coincides with 
the Asian result for the same period, once again highlighting the importance of recessions in 
causing crises. The second best indicator is the fiscal surplus/ GDP. Again, this result accords 
with the Asian country result and therefore confirms the importance of sound government 
finances in mitigating the realisation of banking crises in emerging market economies.  
 
Unlike the Asian sample, however, the third best predictor of Latin American crises is the rate 
of domestic credit growth. This may be associated with the financial liberalisation policies of 
the 1980s in these countries, since such policies lead to deepening of financial markets and 
consequent increases in credit risk. In the Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) sample, over 70% of 
banking crises were preceded by financial liberalisation within the last five years and the 
probability of banking crisis conditional on financial liberalisation having occurred is higher 
than the unconditional probability of banking crisis. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
also find financial liberalisation increases crisis risk within a few years of the liberalisation 
process. 
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While we will not consider the remaining indicators separately due to their relative poor 
performances in terms of the NTSR, it is worth noting the exceptionally inferior performance 
of the domestic credit to GDP ratio as a banking crisis predictor in the Latin American 
countries. Despite Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2005) including this variable as a 
proxy for financial and institutional development, in our sample this variable did not signal 
crises (either correctly or incorrectly) at lower thresholds. However, at higher thresholds (T = 
8 to T = 20) the NTSR starts to fall, indicating that credit/ GDP would have to be substantially 
high before any useful information on financial stability could be inferred. 
 
Although two of the best leading indicators of Latin American crises coincide with the Asian 
results, the optimal thresholds for the two samples differ. In Latin America, the occurrence of 
banking crises is much more sensitive to reductions in GDP growth than in Asia and 
consequently the optimal threshold for the former is much lower (T = 0.5). The NTSR 
associated with the fiscal surplus/ GDP in Latin America reaches a minimum when T = 4 
unlike in Asia where the same indicator has a lower optimal threshold (T = 3.5). 
 
Figure 4: NTSR vs Threshold, Asia and Latin America 
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Figure 4 shows the results for the combined sample. As expected, the first and second best 
leading indicators in the combined sample are GDP growth and the fiscal surplus/ GDP 
respectively. The respective optimal thresholds are T = 0.5 and T = 4, implying that the Latin 
American data drives the result in the combined sample. This may explain why the third best 
leading indicator is inflation with an optimal threshold of T = 6 since this variable was one of 
the worst performers in the Asia-only sample. 
 
Table 9 shows the in-sample performances of the best three variables for each signal 
extraction model. For the Asian model, the rate of real GDP growth outperforms the fiscal 
surplus and rate of depreciation in terms of being able to predict crises as well as in terms of 
being able to predict non-crisis episodes. Consequently, monitoring the rate of GDP growth in 
an economy should allow policy makers to discriminate between crisis and non-crisis events 
with 65% accuracy which is higher than the naïve success rate of 50%. However it is 
interesting to note the exceptionally poor abilities of real GDP growth rates, the extent of 
 15 
fiscal discipline and the level of real domestic credit growth to distinguish between tranquil 
and crisis states in the Latin American countries.  Although these variables are actually better 
at identifying crisis episodes in Latin America than the optimal Asian variables in Asia, 
overall the percentage of correct predictions is much lower than Asian models. Although the 
univariate signal extraction approach is not directly comparable to the multivariate logit 
models we have estimated above, it is interesting to note that the Asian models outperform the 
Latin American and pooled models using both estimation techniques. Once again, our results 
reinforce the need to recognise regional variations in crises determinants when designing 
Early Warning Systems. 
 
We note that the performance of the signal extraction model is generally inferior to that of the 
logit, a point also made in Davis and Karim (2008a). 
 
Table 9: Performance of the signal extraction approach 
 
Real GDP 
Growth 
Fiscal 
Surplus/ 
GDP 
Deprec-
iation
Real GDP 
Growth 
Fiscal 
Surplus/ 
GDP 
Real 
Domestic 
Credit 
Growth 
Real GDP 
Growth Inflation 
Fiscal 
Surplus/ 
GDP 
% crises correct 10 8 6 11 23 23 11 6 13
% no crises correct 99 98 98 98 93 92 98 97 95
% total correct 65 63 62 28 29 29 20 18 19
Asia Latin America Pooled
 
 
5 The binary recursive tree (BRT) 
 
As discussed in the literature survey, the binary recursive tree is a novel approach in the 
financial crisis literature. Our work uses a proprietary software package known as “CART” 
from Salford Systems Inc. to construct the BRT. We give a brief outline of the methodology 
here; a fuller explanation can be found in Breimen at al (1984) and Steinberg and Colla 
(1995) and economic applications can be found in Duttagupta and Cashin (2008) who 
examined banking crises, Manasse et al (2003) who examined sovereign debt crises and 
Ghosh and Ghosh (2002) who examined currency crises. 
 
The BRT process analyses a sample of data to reveal the particular value of the explanatory 
variable that best explains the dependent variable. Hypothetically, it could be established that 
the level of real GDP growth best distinguishes between crisis and non-crisis episodes across 
the entire sample. CART would then search for the exact threshold level of GDP growth that 
separates crises from tranquil periods. Assuming this “splitting value” is 4%, all data will be 
split into two child nodes with observations associated with GDP growth <= 4% in the left 
child node and remaining observations associated with GDP growth > 4% in the right child 
node. If low GDP growth were detrimental to banking stability, we would expect the left child 
node to be concentrated with banking crisis observations relative to the right node; the CART 
algorithm will search through all possible splitting values of all explanatory variables to find 
the best discriminator between crises and non-crises across the entire sample.  
 
Once this “primary splitter” has been obtained, CART will apply the same procedure to 
further split the observations located in the two child nodes and in doing so will generate the 
BRT. This is schematically represented in Figure 5 where the primary splitter is X1 and the 
corresponding threshold value is V1*. Subsequent splitter variables (and their threshold 
values) are given by X2 (V2) and X3 (V3); these values are used to partition the 72 crises in the 
sample. 
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The choice between two potential splitters is made on the basis of their comparative abilities 
to increase node purity, i.e. to concentrate the node further with one type of observation. The 
change in impurity ( )i∆  that arises from splitting (s) the data at a node (t) is defined as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )RRLL tiPtiPtitsi −−=∆ ,       (5) 
 
where ( )ti , ( )Lti  and ( )Rti  are the impurities associated with each existing node and the left 
and right child nodes respectively and PL and PR  are the probabilities of sending an 
observation in the left and right nodes respectively. To quantify the degree of impurity, we 
use a criterion called the Gini measure, which is applicable to binary dependent variables 
(Steinberg and Golovnya, 2007). The Gini measure is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tjPtiPji jicti ||, | ⋅⋅= ∑      (6) 
 
where ( )jic |  is the cost of misclassifying a non-crisis event given that it is a crisis event, 
( )tjp |   is the conditional probability that an observation takes class j given that it lies in node 
t and ( )tip |  is the conditional probability that an observation takes class i given that it lies in 
node t (where j = crisis and i = no crisis). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this section we employ the tree for the Asian and Latin American samples separately, and 
then go on to do a joint estimate for both together as with the logit and signal extraction 
approaches. 
Entire Sample: 72 
crisis periods 
 
PARENT NODE  
Child Node 2:  
20 crisis periods 
 
Child Node 1:  
52 crisis periods 
Terminal Node 3:  
48 crisis periods 
 
Terminal Node 3:  
4 crisis periods 
 
Terminal Node 4:  
17 crisis periods 
 
Terminal Node 5:  
3 crisis periods 
 
Splitter Variable: X1 
 
X1≤ V1
* X1>V1
* 
Splitter Variable: X2 
X2≤ V2
* 
X2> V2
* X3≤ V3
* 
Figure 5: Schematic 
Diagram of Binary 
Recursive Tree (BRT) 
X3≥ V3
* 
Splitter Variable: X3 
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Figure 6 displays the tree based on the Latin American countries only. Across the entire Latin 
American sample, the main discriminator between crisis and non-crisis states is the degree of 
currency depreciation. Specifically, depreciation in excess of 2.55% increases the probability 
of banking crisis to 28% compared to a 6% crisis probability for less severe deprecations. 
 
Crisis probability may substantially worsen if currency depreciation in excess of 2.6% occurs 
in the presence of high levels of banking intermediation; if domestic credit/ GDP exceeds 
26%, it is possible that higher levels of foreign currency borrowing make bank balance sheets 
riskier. In this case, the probability of crisis rises to 39%. 
 
Alongside high currency depreciation, levels of domestic credit/ GDP below 26% result in a 
banking crisis probability of 18%. However, this probability almost doubles (30.5%) if 
inflation also exceeds 30%, whereas if inflation is contained, crisis probability falls to 6.3%. 
In the presence of high inflation, a significant improvement in the terms of trade (above 9%) 
is required to mitigate the probability of crisis, otherwise the likelihood of crisis increases to 
46%. 
 
Figure 6: Splitting Variables and Thresholds for the Latin American Countries 
 
 DCRED <=  -8.02
Terminal
Node 1
Class Cases %
0 14 70.0
1 6 30.0
 DCRED >   -8.02
Terminal
Node 2
Class Cases %
0 147 97.4
1 4 2.6
 DEPREC <=   2.55
Node 2
Class Cases %
0 161 94.2
1 10 5.8
 INFL <=  30.08
Terminal
Node 3
Class Cases %
0 59 93.7
1 4 6.3
 DTT <=   9.10
Terminal
Node 4
Class Cases %
0 20 55.6
1 16 44.4
 DTT >    9.10
Terminal
Node 5
Class Cases %
0 21 91.3
1 2 8.7
 INFL >   30.08
Node 5
Class Cases %
0 41 69.5
1 18 30.5
 DCREDY <=  26.37
Node 4
Class Cases %
0 100 82.0
1 22 18.0
 DCREDY >   26.37
Terminal
Node 6
Class Cases %
0 60 60.6
1 39 39.4
 DEPREC >    2.55
Node 3
Class Cases %
0 160 72.4
1 61 27.6
Node 1
Class Cases %
0 321 81.9
1 71 18.1
 
In cases where depreciation is less than 2.55%, the rate of domestic credit growth is the next 
most important determinant of banking crises. A credit crunch, where the contraction in 
domestic credit supply is more than 8% raises the crisis probability five fold from 5.9% to 
30%. On the other hand, if the credit contraction is less severe and borrowers are able to 
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refinance their debt, then the banking system is less prone to crises with an associated 
probability of 2.7%. 
 
Turning next to the model based on the sub-sample of Asian countries, we note that the 
degree of fiscal discipline, GDP growth and credit/ GDP are the primary factors associated 
with the Asian banking crises, as shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Splitting Variables and Thresholds for the Asian Countries 
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Terminal
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Class Cases %
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1 0 0.0
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Terminal
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0 16 57.1
1 12 42.9
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Node 3
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0 34 73.9
1 12 26.1
 FISCY <=  -1.14
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0 41 51.3
1 39 48.8
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Terminal
Node 4
Class Cases %
0 79 89.8
1 9 10.2
Node 1
Class Cases %
0 120 71.4
1 48 28.6
 
 
Across the Asian sample, the budget surplus/GDP ratio is the primary splitter; a threshold 
value of -1.14% is the single most important discriminator between crisis and non-crisis 
episodes. Governments that ran deficits of more than 1.14% of GDP put their banking 
systems in a riskier position (48.8% crisis probability) than those that maintained moderate 
deficits or surpluses (10.2% crisis probability). This accords with our signal extraction model 
for Asia; a healthy fiscal position allows governments more flexibly to deal with systemic 
banking distress – fiscal laxity may also fuel a boom that leads to a banking crisis.  
 
In the presence of fiscal indiscipline, crisis probabilities are elevated if GDP growth is low. 
The threshold level of 4.75% GDP growth implies that in Asian economies, approximately 
5% of GDP growth is required to counteract the fiscal deficits which impede bank bailouts. If 
GDP growth is below 4.75%, the lack of public financial support to the banking system and 
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the level of non-performing loans put the banking system under stress and the probability of 
crisis rises to 79.4%. 
 
In contrast, if GDP growth exceeds 4.75%, the probability of crisis is much lower at 26.1%. 
This is further reduced if the level of domestic credit/ GDP is lower than 60.49% since in such 
cases, a lesser degree of banking intermediation is associated with lower levels of risky bank 
lending; if banks do supply higher levels of credit relative to GDP, the lack of public financial 
support raises crisis probability to 42.9%. 
 
Figure 8 shows the tree based on the combined sample where the two major branches 
essentially track the regional crises separately: the left part describes the Latin American 
crises4 whilst the right side of the tree describes the Asian crises. The primary splitter across 
the entire sample is the rate of depreciation although the threshold value differs from that of 
the Latin American tree due to the Asian crises which were associated with currency 
depreciation. Consequently, the main discriminator between crisis types is whether a country 
experienced depreciation in excess of -2.08% (i.e. currency appreciation) or a depreciation of 
less that -2.08% (i.e. marginal appreciations or actual declines in currency value). There were 
fewer Asian crises in the sample compared to Latin American crises; appreciation is therefore 
associated with a lower crisis probability in node 5 (11%) than depreciation (30%, in node 2). 
 
Figure 8: Splitting Variables and Thresholds for the Asian and Latin American 
Countries 
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Terminal
Node 1
Class Cases %
0 69 94.5
1 4 5.5
 DTT <=   9.10
Terminal
Node 2
Class Cases %
0 20 55.6
1 16 44.4
 DTT >    9.10
Terminal
Node 3
Class Cases %
0 21 91.3
1 2 8.7
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Node 4
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0 41 69.5
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1 22 16.7
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0 96 58.9
1 67 41.1
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Node 2
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1 89 30.2
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Node 5
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 RIR >    8.42
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Node 6
Class Cases %
0 27 60.0
1 18 40.0
 DEPREC >   -2.08
Node 5
Class Cases %
0 235 88.7
1 30 11.3
Node 1
Class Cases %
0 441 78.8
1 119 21.3
                                               
4
 Hence the similarity between the left side of the tree and the tree based on the Latin American sample. 
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For banking systems in economies where the currency appreciated by more than 2.08%, real 
interest rate movements become critical. Interest rates in excess of 8.42%, possibly linked to 
overvalued exchange rates, would reduce banks’ interest margins, raise the level of non-
performing loans and consequently, raise the risk of a banking crisis to 40%. Conversely, the 
banking system would be less likely to collapse if the currency appreciation was not 
accompanied by high real interest rates; in this case the probability of crisis falls to 5.5%. 
 
In the cases associated with minor currency appreciation or actual depreciation, the level of 
financial intermediation becomes important. Higher levels of intermediation raise the 
probability of crisis to 41%. If financial intermediation, as measured by credit/ GDP ratio, is 
lower than 26.37%, then a crisis is less probable: 16.7%. In such cases however, crises can 
become more likely if authorities do not sufficiently manage inflation. When inflation is 
controlled to rates below 30.08%, the probability of a crisis actually drops to 5.5%. However, 
excessive inflation (above 30%) almost doubles the chances of a systemic banking crisis 
materialising so the probability rises to 30.5%. This probability is worsened even further if the 
terms of trade do not improve in line with the rise in inflation: a change in the terms of trade 
of less than 9.1% raises the probability of crisis to 44.4%. On the other hand, if the high 
inflation is associated with an improvement in export volumes relative to total trade, the crisis 
probability drops to 8.7%.  
 
As noted above, pooling the Latin American and Asian data seems to generate few benefits in 
terms of the identification of a universal set of variables that are determinants of banking 
crises. The tree itself disaggregates the crises according to region suggesting that the interplay 
of factors that caused the crises in Latin America and Asia were indeed different. This implies 
that the use of large cross-country datasets may not be the best approach to identifying 
potential crisis episodes. To further this point, we next compare the in-sample performances 
of the regional models against the pooled model. 
 
Table 10: Performance of the Separate Tree Models 
 
Asia Only 
Tree
Latin 
America Only 
Tree
Pooled 
Sample Tree
% crises 
correct
46 14 0
% no 
crises 
correct
90 92 100
% total 
correct
84 65 62
 
 
 
Table 10 shows the accuracy of each BRT model in terms of its ability to correctly identify 
both crisis and non-crisis episodes. Because the tree essentially generates a discrete crisis 
probability distributions based on all the nodes, a cut-off probability has to be selected 
according to the nodal probabilities. To make our model assessment stringent, we choose to 
set the cut-off probability for each model as the highest probability of all the nodes in that 
model assuming the probabilities do not exceed 50%. If any nodal probabilities exceed 50%, 
then 50% is used as the cut-off in line with the logit models described above.  
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The Asian model is able to classify crisis episodes with the most accuracy but even then, only 
46% of the Asian crisis observations were classified as such. The Latin America model 
performs even worse in terms of crisis prediction, with a success rate of 14%, suggesting 
these crises were more heterogeneous than the Asian crises and that common determinants are 
harder to isolate. Consequently, pooling the Asian and Latin American crises together results 
in no crises being correctly identified. Since this model classes most observations as a non-
crisis episode, it has 100% accuracy in predicting tranquil periods. For similar reasons, the 
regional models also have good abilities to catch tranquil periods which therefore increase the 
overall predictive accuracy of the models. This is however, not of assistance in an exercise 
aimed at capturing the incidence of banking crises. 
 
The charts showing in sample tree prediction for each country, which are summarised in 
Table 10, are included in an Appendix to the paper.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Summarising our results, Table 11 shows the contrasting leading indicators of banking crises 
according to the logit, signal extraction and BRT specifications across different regions. There 
are some common patterns, notably GDP growth is an extremely important crisis determinant 
since it is picked up by virtually all model specifications, irrespective of the geographic 
location of the banking crisis. The fiscal surplus/ GDP ratio also appears to be important in 
mitigating financial instability since the signal extraction model picks this variable up in the 
Asian, Latin American and combined models, whilst the BRT model also uses the variable as 
a splitter in the Asian model. Both the logit and BRT specifications highlight the association 
between the scale of financial intermediation and potential related risk taking by banks and 
the emergence of crises, since either domestic credit/ GDP are highlighted by at least two 
models in each regional sample.  
 
Table 11: Leading Indicator Selection by Model Type and Sample 
 
  
Asia Latin America Combined 
Logit 
Signal 
Extraction Tree Logit 
Signal 
Extraction Tree Logit 
Signal 
Extraction Tree 
Real GDP Growth            
Real Interest Rate  
                  
Inflation  
                
Fiscal Surplus/ GDP  
              
M2/ Foreign Exchange  
Reserves                   
Real Domestic Credit 
 Growth                 
Real GDP per capita               
Domestic credit/GDP               
Depreciation                
Terms of Trade                
Current account/GDP  
                  
External short term debt 
/GDP  
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Further commonalities beyond those discussed above are absent. Some variables such as 
depreciation are detected by different models in different regions (signal extraction and logit 
for Asia and BRT for Latin America), whilst others are highlighted in specific regions and by 
different models (terms of trade and inflation in Latin America). These results therefore 
appear to be underpinned by the different nature of crises in Latin America compared to Asia: 
the Asian crises are linked to financial variables and currency issues whereas the Latin 
American crises are underpinned by financial variables with inflationary and trade issues. 
Pooling is hence seen as inappropriate. 
 
The estimators themselves differ across regions in the variables they highlight, which may 
link in turn to their differing statistical characteristics. Of the three specifications, logit is the 
only parametric estimator such that confidence intervals can be attached to the ranking of 
leading indicators. Moreover, the logit and BRT models are the only ones that are 
multivariate; logit detects the interactions of variables with each other when deciding on the 
best crisis predictors, whilst the BRT model takes this one step further by using non-linear 
variable interactions to map the dynamics of crises. The signal extraction approach isolates 
the behaviour of individual variables in the run-up to a crisis.  Nevertheless it is telling that 
for each model, the predictors differ between regions, and that the performance of the 
combined model is inferior to the regional ones in each case. 
 
For policy purposes, we contend that, in the light of the different variables highlighted for 
each region, as well as the poor overall performance of the combined model, it would appear 
best to estimate the regions separately with all three approaches providing complementary 
warning signals. 
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Figure A1: In Sample Tree Predictions: Asia 
 
Thailand
0
20
40
60
80
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
 
Singapore
0
20
40
60
80
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
Philippines
0
20
40
60
80
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
 
 
 
Malaysia
0
20
40
60
80
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
Korea
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
Indonesia
0
20
40
60
80
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
 
 
 
 
 25
 
Figure A2: In Sample Tree Predictions: Latin America 
 
Argentina
0
20
40
60
80
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
Bolivia
0
20
40
60
80
100
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
Brazil
0
20
40
60
80
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
 
 
 
 
Chile
0
20
40
60
80
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
Ecuador
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
El Salvador
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
 
 
 
 26
 
Guatemala
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
Honduras
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
Mexico
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
 
 
 
 
Panama
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
Paraguay
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
Peru
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
 
 
 
 
 
 27
 
Uruguay
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
 
Venezuela
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Tree Probabilities Actual Probabilities
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28
 
Figure A3: In Sample Tree Predictions: Pooled Data 
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